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THE THROWAWAY CHILDREN. By LISA AVERSA RiCHETTE.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969. Pp. 1, 342. $6.95.
Justine Wise Polierj
The Throwaway Children expresses the justifiable anger and confusion many lawyers and some judges feel when confronted with the
lack of due process and the court delays prevalent in a juvenile court
system which ultimately fails to achieve what society expects of it.
Drawing on her tour of duty as an assistant district attorney in the
Philadelphia Juvenile Court, the author presents case histories with
perceptive and poignant concern. Each child's problem points to the
same deficiencies in the juvenile courts.
The case histories present children hurt by parents, ignored by
schools, and rejected by the community. However, concern for these
neglected, abused, or delinquent children does not blind the author to
the earlier tragedies of parents who have themselves been objects of
parental or community neglect and abuse. Neither does this concern
obscure the terrible inadequacy of services available to the court and
the prevailing apathy of the community-both causative factors in generational tragedies. In light of these realities the author questions the
utility of the juvenile court as an institution and understandably insists
that "when the jammings and the breakdowns persist, it is time to take
a long, hard look at the system itself."
In doing so, the author comes down particularly hard on the inadequate social services which hobble the juvenile courts. She rightly
describes detention facilities as overcrowded jails, sometimes with
superficial decorations. Probation is properly presented as the occasional gesture toward guidance by a "caseworker" whose case load
makes more than a lick and a promise of supervision impossible. The
author's examples of the makeshift operations in public institutions for
delinquents, the dearth of foster homes for dependent and neglected
children, and the lack of facilities for mentally retarded, mentally ill,
and emotionally disturbed children are based on her experience in
Pennsylvania. However, they are all too applicable to conditions prevailing throughout the country.
The kindly, wise judge, confronted with services which rarely help
and often harm the children they "serve," is regarded by the author
t Judge, Family Court of the State of New York. A.B. 1924, Barnard College;
LL.B. 1928, Yale University.
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as someone who can at times prevent injustice and occasionally secure
help for an individual child. But more often, he is reduced to impotence
because he cannot fulfill the obligations imposed by the rhetoric of
juvenile court laws.
While focusing on such failures of the juvenile court system itself,
the author also emphasizes that apathy, indifference, and deeply-rooted
hostility on the part of the public are significant factors in the conversion of juvenile courts from a rehabilitative agency to a "throwaway
process." "Control and punishment, not treatment," she writes, "are
what the public really demands." The author fails to see consistently,
however, the relationship between these public attitudes and the failures
she discerns in the juvenile court system. She is oversimplifying when
she analyzes and evaluates the juvenile courts apart from the larger
society which nurtures or fails to nurture them.
The author also oversimplifies, as well as overgeneralizes, when
she considers the historical development of the juvenile court system.
The past, as she presents it, is far too rosy. She asserts that until
World War II the juvenile court could summon and receive assistance
from budding, idealistic social agencies. At the same time, however,
large numbers of poor children and their problems were ignored and
excluded from any help whatsoever. Few nonwhite children were
considered for placement regardless of need, and those children who
were placed generally were sent to segregated and abominably administered state institutions.
Similarly, the author exaggerates the role and effectiveness of the
nineteenth century "do-gooders." To be sure, they were dreamers,
publicizers, and mobilizers of support for such causes as abolishing
slavery, creating mental hospitals, and improving prison conditions, as
well as helping abused, neglected children. But they took only the
first basic steps toward eliminating the problems they saw so vividly,
and much remained to be done when they finished their work. In
fact, the tasks they set out are still far from completed. Racial injustice
persists. One eminent physician commented recently that the chief
difference between our state prisons and our state hospitals is that the
beds are somewhat softer in the hospitals. Criminal courts have become ports of entry to prisons where convicts become embittered and
hardened rather than rehabilitated.' However, the author fails to
relate these ultimate failures to the transformation of what she terms
Jane Addams's dream of individualized justice into a "nightmare."
Rather than exaggerating the achievements of the "do-gooders" or
belittling such dreams as individualized justice for children, it is necessary to see the juvenile court in perspective and in relation to other
social and judicial institutions of the day.
I It is only recently that the courts have begun to ask whether a person who is
committed as mentally ill to a hospital is "entitled" to appropriate treatment. See, e.g.,
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J.).
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In fairness to the author, the book evidences an awareness of the
complex reasons for tragedies suffered by the parents and children she
describes. She strikes out at ghettoes, the inadequacies of the welfare
bureaucracy, poverty which depresses initiative, schools that fail to
teach, and the lack of services for care and rehabilitation. Unfortunately, here again the author paints with too broad a brush, and
in-depth material is too scanty. Thus the author proposes reforms
which in the light of the problems she has perceptively identified and
described in her case studies, are simplistic, inadequate, and inappropriate. Reforms she suggests, such as voluntary action by labor unions
to end discriminatory practices, women's clubs sponsoring individual
children, voluntary programs in which bright "with it" young fashionables can serve, self-imposed coordination between voluntary agencies,
and aggressive policies by "Y's," churches, and settlement houses to
reach children in trouble, provide no answer to the basic problems the
author recognizes in other parts of the book. Furthermore, the author's
confidence in the benefit of neighbors helping to supervise "failing
families" is not counterbalanced with appropriate concern for the
potential dangers of community vigilantism and invasion of privacy.
There is such an unfortunate lack of central philosophy and consistency in the author's approach to broad basic issues that the book
seems to be the product of two different persons. At one point the
author recognizes the indifference and hostility of Americans to those
who do not "make it"; yet, at another, she optimistically speaks of
America as a humanistically oriented society, ready to be called to
serve the very people it now treats with indifference and hostility.
Other inconsistencies are troubling. While recognizing the need for
vast funding to meet the problems of "throwaway children," the author
proceeds to speak of "a plethora of federal projects." Then, while
hailing the protection of constitutional rights through Gault,' the author
supports a mandatory cooling-off period for divorces and would empower judges to grant or withhold divorces on the basis of their
judgment about what is in the "best interest of children."
Apart from some recommendations for improving court procedure,
the author relies for her proposals on the recommendations of President
Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice.3 In doing so she speaks over-optimistically of the response
to the Kerner Report 4 and states, "We seemed willing enough to
listen when the race issue was the topic. Why then, are we so reluctant to face the realities of crime." The hard fact is that this
country has not responded in any substantive fashion to the problems
presented by either report. To do so would require both a different
2 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3 T

PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADmINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
4 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT ON CiviL DisoDmERs (1968).
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concept of the responsibility of government toward those who have not
been included in the opportunities of an affluent society and a far
greater investment in health, education, welfare, and economic
opportunities.
In light of the case histories eloquently presented by the author
and the findings of the Commission on Law Enforcement, it becomes
clear that the juvenile courts, like the criminal courts of first instance,
reflect the values of American society today and the extent to which
it is unwilling to face the problems of its troubled members. The
present drive for "law and order" without justice, the desire for cheap
solutions to human problems, and the rejection of difficult tasks (including the appropriation of resources to meet essential needs of people)
are trends which must be reversed before "throwaway" children and
adults cease to belie the "American dream."

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A STUDY
OF COMPLIANCE.

Law Press.

1969.

By LUKE T. LEE.

Pp. 231.

Durham, N. C.: Rule of

$7.10.

Lung-sheng Tao t
Despite recent studies of the politics and law, both domestic 1 and
international,2 of Communist China, Western opinion remains divided
over the policy which should be followed towards that country. Some
voices call for continued isolation of the Communist regime, emphasizing evidence of its open hostility to the international status quo. Others,
however, seek an end to isolation and argue that China has indicated a
willingness to accept aspects of the existing international system. A
review of Communist China's twenty-year record in international law
is imperative if this issue is to be resolved satisfactorily.
The official United States view is that Communist China has
shown little interest in, and no real intention of, complying with international agreements or assuming international obligations. In 1958,
for example, a Department of State memorandum announced that Communist China "has shown no intention to honor its international obligations. One of its first acts was to abrogate the treaties of the Republic
of China, except those it chose to continue." ' Moreover, it is the State
Department's opinion that China "has failed to honor various commitments entered into since [the establishment of the regime]." " The
Soviet Union reached a similar conclusion in 1967, when it charged
that China's anti-Soviet activities violated the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid.'
Having concluded that in the past China has shown little interest
in complying with international agreements, western nations, particularly the United States, need answers to several important questions to
evaluate the efficacy of isolation: Is it worthwhile to make treaties with
Communist China? Will Communist China adopt the same law of
t Research Associate in Law, Harvard University. LL.B. 1963, National Taiwan
University; LL.M., 1966, Indiana University; LL.M., 1967, Harvard University;
J.S.D., 1969, Cornell University.
1 E.g., J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

1949-1963 (1968).
2
E.g., Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward International Law, 60 Am.
J. INT'L LAw 245 (1966). For a discussion of new developments in the field of
Chinese law, see Cohen, New Developments in Western Studies of Chinese Law: A
Symposium, 27 J. ASIAN STUDIES 475 (1968).
3 39 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 388 (1958).

4 Id.
5
See Pravda, Feb. 10, 1967, as translated in 19
No. 6, at 6 (March 1, 1967).

(477)

CURRENT DIGEST OF SovEr PRESS,

478

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.118

treaties accepted by western nations? Will China comply with her
international obligations? Luke T. Lee intends to answer some of
these questions in China and InternationalAgreements. In pursuit of
his investigation of China's future behavior, Mr. Lee carefully reviews
Communist China's record of compliance with boundary treaties
(chapter 4), the Korean Armistice Agreement (chapter 6), various
fisheries agreements (chapter 7), trade agreements (chapter 8), and
its behavior in ambassadorial talks with the United States (chapter 5).
He concludes that China has compiled a commendable record of treaty
compliance, and suggests that no evidence exists of noncompliance with
treaties actually concluded by the Peking regime. According to Lee,
Western scholars fail to differentiate clearly between compliance with
treaties and compliance with rules of international law: "The consensus
appears to be that, while negotiations with Peking is not always an easy
matter, once an unambiguous agreement is reached, compliance likely
will follow." 6 Lee then raises the following questions:
In the absence of evidence concerning Chinese noncompliance
based on a review of observable and selected treaties and informal agreements, and in view of at least one instance of
Chinese renunciation of special rights derived from unequal
treaties, would it not be in the world interest to place Peking
under the regime of as many treaties as possible, including
the Charter of the United Nations, the many multilateral
conventions concluded under United Nations auspices such
as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the two
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
and the prospective disarmament treaties including one to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? In the face of
Peking's emphasis on treaty-centered international law, would
it not be desirable for China to participate in the progressive
development of international law and its codification in the
International Law Commission? Would not international
law be made more effective if it were accepted and complied
with by a state whose population constitutes a quarter of
humanity? Indeed, can "international law" be properly socalled if a quarter of the world's population is outside its pale?
Of more immediate relevance, what would be the impact, if
any, of a treaty-bound China upon future policies in VietNam? '
One can hardly contest that it is vital to study in depth the international treaties to which Communist China is a party before a sound
6

L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE

119 (1969).
7Id. 122-23.
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conclusion can be reached about China's record of treaty compliance.
Mr. Lee's book represents a first step toward such an analysis. Nevertheless, one must remember that treaty failure involves many aspects,
only one of which is compliance. It is also concerned with a variety of
ways in which a treaty may cease to serve the purposes for which it
was intended. In addition, a study of China's compliance with official
commitments is relevant to understanding her fundamental attitudes
toward the world community. Thus it is clear that the scope of Lee's
study is unduly narrow, concentrating as it does on China's "compliance with agreements actually concluded by it." '
Moreover, there are other pertinent factors that should be considered in an attempt to predict the treaty behavior of a country. For
instance, some account of the dramatic effect of the Cultural Revolution
with its concomitant internal disorders is necessary. The domestic
economic situation is also one of those factors that tend in varying
situations to affect a government's policy and practice, and it takes on
particular significance in appraising China's international behavior.
For instance, in those years when the economic record was poor (195860), China was unable to meet its export commitments to the Soviet
Union or to Indonesia.
However, Lee unfortunately narrows his scope even further by
dealing only with those treaties which support his conclusion that China
can be trusted. The book reads as though the conclusion began as an
hypothesis which was then confirmed by omission of inconsistent
material; many treaty violations that have inevitably occurred are
ignored by the author.' For example, the discussion is limited to nonpolitical treaties, which substantially diminishes the value of Lee's
observations; any informed scholar knows that Communist China's
record with treaties of nonintervention fails in a comparison with its
performance of nonpolitical agreements.'
But the failures of the book are not merely those of omission.
The author also discusses inadequately several important incidents.
The Sino-Burmese boundary negotiations, for instance, were actually
much more difficult than they appear as described in the book." Similarly, the ambassadorial talks proved to be far more complicated than
Lee indicates.
Furthermore, a study such as Lee's should not lose sight of China's
theory concerning the law of treaties. The Chinese deny that international organizations such as the United Nations are subjects under
international law, and they therefore maintain that such organizations
8id. 11.
9
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10 See C.P.C. Greets 28th Anniversary of Burmese C.P., 10 PEKING REVIEw 5
(1967) ; N.Y. Times, March 22, 1969, at 5, col. 1.
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do not have the capacity to conclude treaties in their own right. Those
like Lee who assert that Communist China would comply with treaties
or agreements concluded by the United Nations, when it actually denies
that organization's capacity for making treaties, bear a heavy burden
in justifying their position.
Communist China's distinctive view of treaty law is also reflected
in its attitudes toward certain international declarations. For example,
it insists that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation are
not broad policy statements, but rather, binding legal commitments. 3
Consequently, compliance with these agreements should, in China's
view, dictate that Taiwan be restored to Communist China immediately. 4
It is reasonable to conclude from Mr. Lee's work that any attempt
to find a fixed "Chinese style" of treaty practice in order to predict
China's future behavior in the international community can yield only
doubtful results of limited value. A proper study of Communist China's
treaty practice demands an understanding of her ideology, political situation, and internal problems, as well as factual research in all of the
treaties (political or otherwise) in which China participates. This
approach would encompass a variety of factors, all of which tend to
affect a nation's decision-making, foreign policy, and international
behavior. Adequate analysis of the problem of treaty compliance requires a wider perspective than that taken in the author's book. While
Lee's work represents a first and important step toward the study of
Communist China's treaty law and practice, a reliable prediction of
China's future behavior awaits more precise observation and description.
12

See Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of Communist China's Treaty Practice, 1967
117-19; Chiu, The
Theory and Practice of Communist China wtih Respect to the Conclusion of Treaties,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AmERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

5 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1966).

'3 See U.N. Doc. S/1715 (1950) (statement by Chou-En-lai) ; Shao Chin-fu, The
Absurd Theory of "Two Chinas" and Principles of InternationalLaw, 1959 STUDIES
IN POLITICS AND LAw (CHENG-FA-YEN-CHIU), No. 2, at 14.
14 For a discussion of the Western views on this problem, see Jain, The Legal
Status of Formosa, 57 Am. J. INTL' L. 25 (1963).
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THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE. By STUART S. NAGEL. Homewood, Illinois: The
Dorsey Press, 1969. Pp. xv, 399. $8.50.
Sheldon Goldman Inherent in the traditional approach to study of the legal process
was a commitment to the status quo and a disinterest in the empirical
study of the causes and effects of legal policies. Holmes and Pound,
among others, began attacks on this traditional approach, and with
the encounter between the social forces generated by the Depression and
the intransigence of a largely conservative judiciary, a more radical
group of so-called legal realists emerged. Their credo was, in the
words of Karl Llewellyn, to examine all aspects of the legal process to
"see it as it works," and using mostly crude and simple analytical
tools, they systematically gathered empirical data. However, the influence of these legal realists on the law schools and legal scholarship
waned as the 1930's came to a close.
At the same time that legal realism was beginning to flourish, the
political science profession experienced an analogous intellectual upheaval. In contrast to the short-lived effect of the legal realists, the
innovators in the political science profession guided the transformation
of their discipline from its traditional and institutional focus to one that
is behavioral and empirical. Political scientists involved in public law
were slower than their colleagues in other sub-fields of the discipline to
utilize the behavioral perspective and to develop quantitative techniques,
perhaps because of their cross-disciplinary ties to conventional legal
analysis. But by the mid-1960's an impressive array of public law
political scientists had brought public law into the mainstream of the
profession.
As a result of these developments in political science and a growing awareness of America's manifold social problems and the relationship of the legal system to those problems, the empirical approach
of the legal realists began to find new acceptance in the law schools in
the 1960's. A new trend of legal scholarship was evidenced by numerous empirical studies of jury decision-making, bail, plea-bargaining,
police practices, the law and the poor, and compliance with Supreme
Court decisions. It is within this context of developments in legal and
political science scholarship that The Legal ProcessFrom a Behavioral
Perspective by Stuart S. Nagel, a practicing lawyer and professor of
political science at the University of Illinois, ought to be considered.
t Associate Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts.
New York University; M.A. 1964, Ph.D. 1965, Harvard University.
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I. STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE

Professor Nagel's book is derived from twenty-five of his research
papers published over the last decade, primarily in law journals, but
also in leading political science periodicals. The studies are linked
together by short introductory essays, an epilogue, and a conceptual
framework which is founded on the stimulus-response paradigm. In
Nagel's words, "law is viewed mainly as the responses to prior stimuli,
and as stimuli to the subsequent responses of law appliers and law
recipients" (p. vii). This behavioral perspective also represents a
commitment to the systematic study of empirical phenomena and the
use of statistical tools to analyze the data.
It is clear that a basic purpose of the book is to demonstrate how
the behavioral perspective can be used to study a variety of research
questions which are of interest to scholars in both law and political
science. Among the questions Nagel considers are: Do disparities
exist in different courts concerning the administration of criminal
procedure and the sentencing of defendants of different backgrounds?
Is there a relationship between the characteristics of attorneys and
courtroom results? Is it possible to forecast judicial decisions? Does
the fact that a judge was elected or appointed make any difference in
his decisions? What are the attitudes of judges in terms of "liberalismconservatism" and how do their attitudes differ from those of legislators and administrators? What are the factors that account for
the apparent success or failure of congressional attempts to curb the
Supreme Court? What have been the effects of excluding illegally
seized evidence from courtroom proceedings?
In a general sense the book is a synthesis of the recent trends in
both law and political science. For the practical legal scholar, Nagel
intends to present the methods he has used and to demonstrate their
application to concrete questions of legal policy. For the social scienceoriented political scientist, he intends to present findings with theoretical
import for the study of judicial behavior, and which are relevant to an
understanding of the judicial system in the context of the American
political system. But his success in these endeavors is incomplete.
It should be emphasized that Nagel is an extraordinarily creative,
innovative, and productive scholar. The scope of his research interests
and the ambitious objectives of his book are impressive. Both political
scientists and legal scholars ought to become acquainted with Nagel's
substantive findings and methodology if they have not already done
so through his original publications. Furthermore, while it has become
fashionable in some legal circles to be enthusiastic about empirical investigation of juries, lawyers, police practices, and legal procedures,
when judicial decision-making is subject to a similar quantitative
analysis, these same enthusiasts resort to the glib quip "thinkers don't
count and counters don't think." Nagel demonstrates the inconsistency
of this position. Nevertheless, with all these compelling points in his
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favor, in this reviewer's opinion, the author does not entirely succeed.
At the risk of giving aid and comfort to the thinkers-don't-count school,
a brief discussion of some reservations follows.
II. CRITICISiS AND RESERVATIONS
Perhaps the major difficulty with the work lies in the fact that it
is not the "coherent whole" that the author has attempted to present.
Even in its revised form it is still, to a considerable extent, a collection
of twenty-five articles written at different times with different objectives, and at different stages of Nagel's career. Despite his attempt to
provide suitable transitions, and his occasional extensive revision of
articles, Nagel has not satisfactorily integrated his studies into a
smooth, logically coherent text. Several of the studies are awkwardly
placed-for example, those in the three chapters in part two, section one
of the book. A further consequence of attempting to integrate what
might more appropriately be labeled an anthology is that footnotes in
many of the chapters are repetitive and outdated. The data base in at
least one article, for instance (on political party representation of
judges), is out of date. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the chapters contain no consideration of the relevant research and writing
developed after the original publications of the articles, although the
introductory material and the epilogue do briefly mention much of the
recent literature.
The conceptual scheme that Nagel presents in the first chapter also
deserves critical comment. Although the scheme is based on the
stimulus-response paradigm of psychology, he does not present a detailed psychological explanation of his adaptation of that paradigm.
There is no specification of either the nature or kind of interrelationships of variables. His scheme does not suggest, for instance, what
background variables are more important than others, or the relationship, indeed the crucial distinction, between backgrounds and attitudes.
His scheme therefore is less than a satisfactory contribution to the
theory of judicial behavior. For the same reasons, his scheme is weak
as an over-all organizing framework. Nagel rejects the alternative
organizing framework of systems analysis because he claims it is too
institutional. Yet his own scheme is of the legal process and not of
actual decision-making. In fact Nagel uses the systems concept of
feedback in his framework and hints that input-output systems analysis
is really identical to his stimulus-response analysis (which is not entirely true). In short, the fact that the conceptual scheme is not as well
developed as it should have been decreases its theoretical contribution.
Nagel's main concern is to enable the practicing lawyer, the legal
policy-maker, and the legal scholar to predict judicial response in a
variety of situations, and his focus is on applied research. However,
both lawyers and political scientists would have found the work more
useful had Nagel devoted a portion of his book to the methods and
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findings of others in this field. Although sections of the text and
footnotes explain various methodological approaches and statistical concepts, the book would have profited from a greater consideration of
prediction and its limits in social science research. Readers might have
also benefited if the more sophisticated methods of later studies were
used to reanalyze the findings of the earlier articles. Finally,
although Nagel's concern with "the application of the scientific
method to building . . . a little better legal system than might other-

wise be the case" (p. 317) is commendable, his insistence that "an
imperfect policy study is more likely to offer more social and theoretical
benefits than no policy study at all" (p. 386) needs to be qualified.
Surely an empirical analysis that is inadequate, because of inadequate
data or analysis, may be grossly misleading and do more harm than
good. The problem, of course, is deciding where to draw the line
between "imperfect, but adequate" and "imperfect and inadequate."
Some of the studies themselves give this reviewer minor qualms.
For example, Nagel's major finding concerning party affiliation and
decision-making in criminal cases (chapters fourteen and eighteen) is
based on a study of fifteen bipartisan supreme courts. But the results
from only 10 of the courts confirmed the hypothesis, while the results
from 5 courts disconfirmed it. The correlations between backgrounds
and decision-making are all low, and only four of the twelve correlations
presented are statistically significant. In these background studies,
Nagel could well have used multivariate, rather than bivariate, analysis.
Additionally, when reporting the results of an attitudinal questionnaire
sent to state supreme court and federal judges, and to a sample of
state and federal legislators and administrators (chapter sixteen),
Nagel claims that the judges were "substantially more conservative"
(p. 206) than the two other groups on the free speech issue. Yet the
results show no real difference among the groups on what seems to be the
key free speech item, relating to one's attitude on unrestricted freedom
of discussion. Finally, in the study of editorial reaction to four church
and state cases (chapter 22), Nagel constructed a scale which is suspect
because the large number of nonresponses and unavailable editorials
(21 of 24 on Everson, 18 of 24 on Zorach, and 14 of 24 on McCollum
were not classified) precludes an accurate determination of scale scores
and positions. It is therefore inaccurate to claim, as does the author
(p. 288), that the editorial responses form a perfect Guttman scale.
III. CONCLUSION
Nagel's book appears at a point in time when the trends in legal
and political science scholarship overlap substantially, at least in terms
of research interests. Because of this overlap Nagel's book is relevant
to students and practitioners of both professions, who should find it
instructive and suggestive for further empirical research. On balance,
this book is a major contribution to both disciplines.

